Higher water tariffs for less river pollution—evidence from Min River and Fuzhou City, People’s Republic of China by Jiang, Yi et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Higher water tariffs for less river
pollution—evidence from Min River and
Fuzhou City, People’s Republic of China
Yi Jiang and Leshan Jin and Tun Lin
Asian Development Bank
May 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24992/
MPRA Paper No. 24992, posted 15. September 2010 09:12 UTC
ADB Economics 
Working Paper Series
Higher Water Tariffs for Less River Pollution—
Evidence from Min River and Fuzhou City, 
People’s Republic of China
Yi Jiang, Leshan Jin, and Tun Lin
No. 201  |   May 2010

ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 201
Higher Water Tariffs for Less  
River Pollution—Evidence from Min River 
and Fuzhou City, People’s Republic of China
Yi Jiang, Leshan Jin, and Tun Lin 
May 2010
Yi Jiang is an Economist in the Economic Analysis and Operations Support Division, Economics and 
Research Department, Asian Development Bank (ADB). Leshan Jin is Professor at the College of 
Humanities and Development, China Agricultural University. Tun Lin is Natural Resources Economist in 
the Agriculture, Environment, and Natural Resources Division, East Asia Department, ADB. The views 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of 
the Asian Development Bank or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. The ADB does 
not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any 
consequence of their use.
Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org/economics
©2010 by Asian Development Bank
May 2010
ISSN 1655-5252
Publication Stock No. WPS101559
The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views or policies
of the Asian Development Bank.
The ADB Economics Working Paper Series is a forum for stimulating discussion and 
eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies 
undertaken by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) staff, consultants, or resource 
persons. The series deals with key economic and development problems, particularly 
those facing the Asia and Pacific region; as well as conceptual, analytical, or 
methodological issues relating to project/program economic analysis, and statistical data 
and measurement. The series aims to enhance the knowledge on Asia’s development 
and policy challenges; strengthen analytical rigor and quality of ADB’s country partnership 
strategies, and its subregional and country operations; and improve the quality and 
availability of statistical data and development indicators for monitoring development 
effectiveness. 
The ADB Economics Working Paper Series is a quick-disseminating, informal publication 
whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as articles in professional 
journals or chapters in books. The series is maintained by the Economics and Research 
Department.
Contents
Abstract   v
I.  Introduction  1
II.  Literature Review 5
 A. PES in and outside the PRC 5
 B. Water Tariffs and WTP for Water Services in the PRC 6
III. Methodology 8
 A. Survey Design 8
 B. Survey Administration 8
 C. Econometric Models 10
IV. Data   11
V. Results  16
 A. Separate Logit Models 16
 B. Interval Regression for WTP 18
 C. Cost–Benefit Analysis for the Fuzhou PES Program 21
 D. Affordability and Distributional Issues 21
VI. Conclusion  22
References   24

Abstract
Upstream nonpoint source pollution has become a significant threat to 
urban drinking water safety in the People’s Republic of China. Payment for 
environmental services (PES) is seen as a promising mechanism to deal with 
the situation. In designing a sound PES, it is crucial to determine the willingness 
to pay (WTP) of urban beneficiaries for upstream water pollution controls. An 
analysis of household data from a contingent valuation survey conducted in 
Fuzhou in 2009 reveals that household income is the most important factor in 
determining respondents’ positions on water tariff increases as well as WTP 
under a PES scheme. Mean WTP varies from Yuan (CNY) –0.45 per cubic meter 
to CNY0.86 for different income groups. The overall mean WTP is estimated to 
be CNY0.21, which is equivalent to a 10% increase in the current tariff, with the 
95% confidence interval at (CNY0.12, CNY0.31). The point estimate implies a 
total annual WTP of Fuzhou City equal to CNY22 million, which is 27% less than 
the contribution of Fuzhou to an ongoing government-financed PES. However, 
with continuous water tariff increases, affordability among low-income households 
might arise as an issue. This calls for subsidies targeting low-income households 
to be incorporated in water tariff reform.

I. Introduction
Water pollution has emerged as one of the most serious environmental problems facing 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It threatens human and ecosystem health, 
increases water treatment costs, exacerbates water scarcity, and ultimately will constrain 
the sustainability of the country’s development. The results of monitoring more than 400 
river sections around the country suggest that overall water quality remains poor, despite 
some moderate improvements in recent years (Figure 1). By 2008, water quality in 45% 
of the monitored river sections was below class III, making them ineligible for drinking 
even after treatment, and 21% were too polluted for any use.1 Annual surveys since 2006 
have found that over one-quarter of drinking water sources in key cities have failed to 
meet standards. 
Figure 1:  River Water Quality in the PRC, 2005–2008 (percent)
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While water pollution is recognized as a top issue, most attention is given to stationary 
industrial polluting sources and domestic sewage discharge. Agricultural pollution—the 
largest source of surface water pollution (Zhang et al. 2009), consisting of nonpoint 
1 Environmental Quality Standards for Surface Water (GB 3838-2002) defines water quality in five classes in the PRC. 
Classes I-III are water safe for human consumption after treatment; IV-V are water safe for industrial and irrigation 
use; and class V+ is unsafe for any use (PRC EPB 2002).
sources such as animal waste, and often located at upstream sources—remains 
unchecked and is generally out of control. As such, it represents a significant challenge 
to water pollution control in that upstream towns and villages and downstream cities 
are at different stages of development and have distinct development goals. Upstream 
towns and villages, which are often poor and lack income sources other than agriculture, 
prioritize improving agricultural production over preserving river water quality. Wealthier, 
more populous downstream cities increasingly demand clean air and water as well as 
other environmental amenities. Upstream pollution of the water sources jeopardizes 
downstream residents' access to safe drinking water. 
Tension between upstream and downstream areas is therefore common in the PRC and 
in other countries. But the polluters-pay principle may not be appropriate in dealing with 
the nonpoint sources, both because the polluters have legitimate rights to develop, and 
because tremendous implementation and enforcement costs may arise when applying 
command-and-control measures or pollution levies.2 Alternative policy instruments are 
desirable that align the incentives of both parties and offer the needed upstream help for 
making changes. 
Payment for environmental services (PES) is one such instrument.3 PES is an 
arrangement in which those who benefit from environmental services make payments 
to the service provider(s) to compensate for their efforts or foregone benefits. PES 
improves economic efficiency by creating voluntary market transactions to internalize the 
external benefits of environmental services. Environmental services amenable to PES 
schemes include watershed protection, forest and pasture conservation, biodiversity 
and species habitat preservation, and so on. In the case of watershed protection and 
upstream pollution control, the budget of the downstream cities and/or additional funds 
collected from water users’ bills generally finance the payments. They are made when the 
environmental service is secured, such as when water quality improves to a certain level 
at pre-agreed locations.  
Fuzhou City, at the downstream end of the Min river basin, and the upstream 
municipalities of Nanping and Sanming, provide a typical setting for studying PES. The 
Min River runs from the western mountainous areas of Fujian province eastward down 
into the East China Sea. It is the main source of drinking water for Fuzhou City’s 2.3 
million people. As the provincial capital, Fuzhou has an industrialized and diversified 
economy, while Nanping and Sanming are less developed, with a large number of 
villages and towns heavily reliant on livestock farming. Nanping alone hosts over 480,000 
livestock farms and the business has been growing in both municipalities. Without 
proper discharge treatment, these livestock farms, especially the large ones, are the 
most important contributors to Min River pollution. As of 2003, the percentage of water 
graded class III or above in the Min River dropped to 83% from 96% in 2001 (Figure 2). 
2 Liang et al. (2005) found that the majority of farmers living around the Miyun reservoir—Beijing’s water source—
were willing to pay nothing or very little for reservoir environmental protection.
3 The “E” in PES stands for environmental, ecological, or ecosystem in the literature. The concepts are close enough 
so we do not make any distinction.
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According to an official survey, 63% of Min River pollution in terms of chemical oxygen 
demand load and ammonia nitrogen load can be attributed to livestock pollution (Fujian 
EPB 2005).
The Fuzhou government was faced with two options.4 One was to seek alternative water 
sources aside from the Min River, although past experience suggested this could be 
prohibitively expensive. Fuzhou introduced water from the Ao River in the late 1990s 
to supply one-twelfth of its population living in Mawei and neighboring districts. But the 
project had cost CNY690 million, resulting in considerably higher water supply costs 
than from the Min River. The government therefore chose the second option: to finance 
upstream pollution control and reduction by building and operating waste treatment 
facilities for livestock farms. In 2005, it joined the Min River Environmental Protection 
campaign launched by the Fujian provincial government,5 featuring a pilot PES program 
financing pollution control in Nanping and Sanming, particularly livestock, with a total 
of CNY50 million each year. The Fuzhou government contributed CNY10 million to the 
program, raising its contribution to CNY30 million in 2009 when the program was doubled 
(Fujian EPB 2009).6
Figure 2: Proportion of River Water with Class I–III Quality in the Min River, 1995–2008 
(percent)
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4 Enhancing water treatment is not an option once water quality deteriorates below class III since it is the lowest 
level of water eligible for drinking after treatment. 
5 The Min River was highly polluted before 1997. In 1992 only 30% of its water was classified as class III or above. 
The Fujian provincial government launched its first Min River Environmental Protection campaign during 1998–
2000 targeting industrial pollution from stationary sources. However, the water quality started to degenerate after 
it reached a peak in 2001, with most of the pollution contributed by nonpoint agricultural sources. 
6 The rest of program funds before 2009 came from the Fujian provincial government (CNY30 million per year) 
and the Nanping and Sanming governments (CNY5 million per year each). In 2009, the provincial contribution 
increased to CNY60 million, while Nanping and Sanming’s remained the same. Considering that the Min River 
protection also generated benefits to the province as a whole and the upstream cities, the funding from 
corresponding sources conceivably internalized these benefits. 
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While the government initiative was important for starting the process, it generated 
efficiency and sustainability concerns. While government budgets are financed by public 
revenues, payment using government budgets is not directly linked to water usage 
and, hence, to the WTP of individual beneficiaries. To better reflect the values of the 
environmental service and to be sustainable in the long run, it is recommended that PES 
programs be transformed from government financing to user financing (Engel, Pagiola, 
and Wunder 2008). The basic idea of the latter is to raise extra funds through a water 
tariff increase and earmark the funds for upstream water pollution control. 
A key element of the success of a user-financed PES program is determining the 
appropriate level of water tariff increment, which would depend on the mean WTP of 
residential water users for clean drinking water. As reviewed below, literature on the WTP 
for water quality of urban households is sparse. Moreover, WTP may vary with income 
level and other factors, such as water demand and pollution awareness. It is therefore 
necessary to obtain city-based WTP estimates. The primary contribution of this paper is 
to fill in this gap with reliable evidence from Fuzhou City. The results could be used not 
only to inform relevant policy makers, but also to provide reference information for cities 
with similar income levels and water resource constraints.
It is recognized that increasing a utility tariff is a politically sensitive issue almost 
everywhere in the world, and the PRC is no exception. In 2009, debate over proposed 
water tariff increases in numerous cities of various sizes at different income levels 
reached new heights.7 Proponents of water tariff increases, mostly local governments 
and water companies, argued that current water tariffs are too low to recover the financial 
costs of water supply and wastewater treatment, let alone the environmental and resource 
depletion costs of water use. They also noted that other countries' water tariffs are higher 
and water expenditures account for a larger proportion of urban incomes than in the 
PRC. Opponents counter that a lack of transparency in utility operations makes it unclear 
what causes the financial deficiencies of the water supply companies and wastewater 
treatment facilities. When a utility is privatized, the public grows concerned that this will 
trigger a water tariff increase due to the initial high selling price of the utility or the undue 
profit demands of the acquisition companies. Although water tariffs appear lower and less 
income is spent on water in the PRC, per capita income level is also lower and a larger 
share of income has to be spent on food and housing than in the comparison countries. 
These heated debates convey some important messages, but they do not necessarily 
foreshadow the rational choice people would make between a reasonable price increase 
and unsafe drinking water. Nor can they precisely inform policy makers of the prevailing 
valuation of residential water users for clean water sources. The design of the survey 
in Fuzhou allows us to investigate who would object to a proposed water tariff increase 
and what factors drive individuals' decisions, in addition to estimating the mean WTP 
7 The Administrative Regulation on Urban Water Supply Pricing introduced in 1998 assigns the responsibility of 
setting water tariffs to municipalities (World Bank 2009). 
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for an upstream reduction in water pollution. Moreover, we analyze affordability and the 
distributional effects of a water tariff increase, which could shed light on some of the 
water tariff reforms under consideration.
In the rest of the paper, Section II reviews PES practice in and outside the PRC, in 
particular cases of watershed protection and water pricing and WTP for water services 
in the PRC. Section III introduces the survey methodology and the econometric models, 
and Section IV summarizes the data. Section V reports estimation results. The effects of 
income level and distribution on WTP, the costs and benefits of the Fuzhou PES program, 
and the affordability and welfare impacts of water tariff increases are discussed, based on 
the estimates. Section VI concludes.  
II. Literature Review
A. PES in and outside the PRC
The earliest practices of PES in the world are associated with watershed management 
and potable water supply (World Bank 2009). Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) survey 61 
watershed-based payment schemes. They find that markets for watershed services have 
only recently been established, thus there is still a lack of documentation and assessment 
of their effectiveness. Usually, markets for watershed services are small-scale and 
involve a relatively small number of easy-to-identify providers and beneficiaries. In 
larger watersheds, hydrological links between upstream land use and downstream water 
impacts are weak and uncertain, so it is more difficult to measure whether and how much 
beneficiaries may be willing to pay for services. One example involving international trade 
between Argentina and Bolivia is included in the survey.
One of the best-known examples, which is also highly similar to our Fuzhou case, is New 
York City’s Watershed Agriculture Program (USEPA 2006, Pagiola and Platais 2007). 
The city obtains its water supply from watersheds in the Catskill Mountains north of the 
city. In the late 1980s, many dairy and livestock farms emerged in the Catskills, leading 
to serious nonpoint source pollution, sewage contamination, and soil erosion directly 
threatening drinking water safety. City water planners launched the Watershed Agriculture 
Program in 1994 to address the issue. The program included payment by the water utility 
to the Catskills farmers for both on-farm capital costs and pollution-reducing agricultural 
measures. The program cost New York City about $1.5 billion to implement, 20% less 
than constructing and operating a water treatment system. 
The PRC government has been experimenting with PES schemes since the 1980s, 
when the Ministry of Water Resources attempted to protect fragile watersheds through 
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the contracting out of land in sensitive areas to households, conditional upon their 
adoption of appropriate management practices. As early as 1991, market mechanisms 
for watershed management were introduced in legislation, in this case the Water 
and Soil Conservation Act. In recent years, interest in PES as a policy instrument for 
environmental management and ecosystem protection has kept growing in both central 
and local governments. 
While a PES payment system can take many forms, such as a voluntary contractual 
agreement, public payment scheme, or trading scheme (Salzman and Lin 2010), the 
government-led PES, with heavy reliance on public financial transfers, is dominant in the 
PRC. For example, several PES schemes implemented by the central government are 
among the largest public payment schemes for ecosystem services in the world. They 
include the Sloping Land Conversion Program, the Natural Forest Protection Project, and 
the Forest Ecosystem Compensation Fund. Some regional or local level PES programs, 
mainly using public funds, include the water rights trading scheme between Yiwu and 
Dongyang cities in Zhejiang Province; the evolving framework of integrated watershed 
management and payments being developed between Beijing, Tianjin, and local 
governments in the upper watershed of the Miyun reservoir; and the water use payment 
scheme between the water company in Lijiang and Baisha town and the nearby water 
sources. Unfortunately, the effectiveness and efficiency of some of these programs are 
being questioned. Recent analysis (IIED 2006, Xu et al. 2006, White and Martin 2002, 
Scherr et al. 2006, and Uchida et al. 2007) has raised concern over the long-run financial 
sustainability of some national programs. It has been suggested that the problems with 
current PES practices lie partly in neglecting the roles of environmental service providers 
and beneficiaries in the transaction. In a PES driven by private players, the government 
could play a supporting role in creating and maintaining an enabling market environment 
(World Bank 2009).
B. Water Tariffs and WTP for Water Services in the PRC
Urban water tariffs for residential use typically consist of two parts: a water supply fee 
and a wastewater treatment fee. To reflect the environmental value and scarcity of 
water resources, the water resource fee has been introduced into water tariff structures 
in recent years in some cities. Domestic water tariffs in the PRC have been increasing 
constantly since the early 1990s. From 1998 to 2007, water tariffs in 35 major cities 
rose on average by 7.1% annually. By the end of 2008, the average domestic water 
tariff in these cities was around CNY2.40 per cubic meter, of which CNY0.67 or so is a 
wastewater charge.8 Fuzhou adopts an increasing block tariff structure. The base water 
tariff is CNY2.05 per cubic meter, including a CNY0.85 wastewater treatment fee. For 
monthly water consumption between 18 and 25 cubic meters and above 25 cubic meters, 
8 Wangjun Zhou, Vice Director of Price Bureau, National Development and Reform Commission, in an interview with 
CBN in July 2009.
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the water charges are CNY2.65 and CNY3.25, respectively, with the increments attributed 
to water supply. 
But current water tariffs are still considered too low given that utilities’ revenues do not 
fully cover financial costs in many cities (World Bank 2009). Subsidies using public funds 
are the sector norm. According to the National Development and Reform Committee, 
the average water treatment charge in the big cities is equivalent to two thirds of 
the treatment cost. A large number of cities still lack adequate wastewater treatment 
capacity. Water tariff reform featuring further hikes to water tariffs could send the right 
signals about the scarcity of water and induce more water conservation and efficiency 
in water use. Nevertheless, the optimal tariff structure, water users’ WTP, and the 
equality of tariff reform, among others, are issues that need to be investigated carefully. 
In the case of Fuzhou City, we need to know how much residents are willing to pay to 
upstream polluters for less discharge and better pollution control, whether the total WTP 
is adequate to finance upstream efforts in pollution reduction, and how a tariff increase 
based on the average WTP would affect the welfare of different income groups.
Compared to the large body of literature on WTP for water supply and quality in the 
developed and some developing countries (e.g., Viscusi et al. 2008, Ojeda et al. 2008), 
studies on the economic valuation of water services and clean water from the demand 
side are quite limited in the PRC. The World Bank sponsored a contingent valuation study 
in Chongqing City, one of the biggest in the western PRC. Wang et al. (2008) analyze 
the survey data on WTP for better water service among 1,500 households. The survey 
used a multiple-bounded discrete choice model, which asked respondents to indicate 
their levels of acceptance with respect to a list of potential water prices.9 The analyses 
show that the average WTP is between CNY2.5 to CNY3.3, or 14% to 50% greater 
than the existing average tariff of CNY2.2. WTP is lower in absolute terms in poorer 
households, but as a percentage of income it is higher than the existing average. About 
20% of households strongly reject a moderate price increase and the rejection rates go 
up with the proposed water tariff, even though the average economic burden is no higher 
than 2.1% of income. The authors conclude that water tariff reform that aims at a price 
increase could be successful if a subsidy is applied to the poor, and public awareness 
and accountability are raised. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on WTP 
among the Chinese for protecting water sources through upstream pollution control. 
9 It is noted that the multiple-bounded discrete choice modelapproach has a potential bias problem associated with 
the order of presenting the water prices to the respondents. 
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III. Methodology
A. Survey Design
To estimate residents’ WTP for water source pollution control, a contingent valuation 
(CV) survey is designed following the CV practice protocol recommended by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration panel (Arrow et al. 1993). The survey 
employs in-person instead of telephone-based or web-based interviews, aiming for more 
precise information and less uncertainty in the responding sample. The questionnaire 
contains five sections: survey background and purpose; household demographic and 
socioeconomic profiles; water consumers’ perception of water quality; and WTP elicitation 
and debriefing. The interview begins with an introduction in which the following scenario 
is described: the majority of residential piped water comes from the Min River, whereas 
public funds for pollution treatment fall short because pollution sources are numerous and 
widespread in the broad upstream area. If additional revenues could be generated from a 
tariff increase for piped water, upstream farmers would be paid for pollution control, and 
downstream water users would benefit. The hypothetical commodity for which interviewed 
households are asked to pay is described as the avoidance of a deterioration of Min 
River water to below class III of GB3838-2002 from the present class III. 
The WTP is elicited through two sequential questions in a referendum format. First, 
the respondent is asked whether he/she is willing to see an increase in the water tariff 
if extra funding needs to be raised through an increase in the water bill to treat Min 
River pollution, in particular to treat the nonpoint pollution from the upstream livestock 
industry. Those answering “no” are asked to choose from a list of reasons or give their 
own reasons. Those answering “yes” are then asked whether they are willing to pay a 
specific increase on top of the current tariff. The bid of the increase for each interview 
was randomly selected from five possibilities, i.e., 0.1, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9, and 1.2 (CNY/
cubic meter). These bids range from 8% to 100% of the existing base water supply fee 
(excluding CNY0.85 /cubic meter of wastewater treatment fee) and from 5% to 59% 
of the base total water tariff. The survey reminds respondents to take into account the 
implied increase in expenditure, proportion of the water bill increase in total monthly 
expenditure, and potential alternative uses of the money. Once asked, the interviewer 
informs the respondent of the existing water tariff divided into base water fee and 
wastewater treatment fee. To confirm the answer, after the respondent answers yes or no, 
an open-ended question follows asking for brief reasons for approving or not approving 
the proposed increase. 
B. Survey Administration
A total of 14 enumerators (eight female and six male undergraduates from local 
universities or graduates from China Agricultural University in Beijing) were trained to 
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conduct interviews. The training aimed to have the enumerators understand the purpose 
of the survey, become familiar with the survey instrument, and acquire and share survey 
techniques. The questionnaire was also refined during the training. The following activities 
were included in the training:
(i) discussion of the purpose of the survey
(ii) explanation of the CV method and enumerator rules recommended in ADB (2007)
(iii) discussion of the questions in the questionnaire
(iv) specific discussion of the WTP elicitation question and how to ask it
(v) discussion of how the survey data would be used in the final analysis
(vi) role-playing where some enumerators act as interviewees
The draft questionnaire was pretested with 20 respondents, revealing some deficiencies 
and leading to important changes, including, among others: shortening the opening 
introduction from 5 to 2 minutes; asking about incomes in brackets rather than exact 
numbers; clarifying that housing area refers to construction area;10 obtaining the 
respondent’s precise address from the enumerators rather than from the respondents; 
and using the local dialect in interviewing elderly respondents.
The 14 enumerators were divided into four teams, each with a coordinator whose 
responsibilities included onsite supervision of interviews and revisiting selected samples. 
During onsite supervision, the coordinator ensured the completion of interviews, 
answered unusual questions encountered by team members, and reviewed the completed 
questionnaires before leaving the site.
The survey was targeted at four urban districts of Fuzhou City that draw their drinking 
water from the Min River—Gulou, Taijiang, Cangshan, and Jinan—excluding the Mawei 
district, which  obtained its water from an alternative source. Since little evidence 
was found suggesting significant differences across districts, a neighborhood-level 
stratification sampling frame was adopted. By the end of 2008, there were a total of 292 
neighborhoods hosting 543,133 households in these four districts (Fuzhou Statistical 
Bureau 2009).  Although efforts were made to access all neighborhoods, some were very 
difficult to reach and thus were missing in the sample. The survey, in the end, covered 
256 neighborhoods for a coverage rate of 87.7%.  
10 Construction area of an apartment differs from the actual living area in terms of including the share of public area 
such as stairs and elevators. It is generally 20–40% bigger than the actual living area in the PRC.
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Given budget and time constraints, the planned sample size was 750. Interviewers 
conducted the survey on 7–14 July 2009 and collected 777 responses, accounting 
for about 1.43% of the population. The coordinators conducted random revisits to 37 
households, about 5% of the sample, either by telephone interview or in person. Two 
interviews done in a park near the neighborhood, which could not be verified, were 
removed from the sample, leaving 775 valid observations. 
C. Econometric Models
The primary question this study attempts to answer is how much an average household 
would be willing to pay to control water source pollution through a PES system. The 
sequential structure used to elicit WTP yields three categories of households. The first 
is those unwilling to pay a water tariff increase at all, putting their WTP theoretically at 
or below zero.11 The second is willing to pay a surcharge less than the tariff increase 
proposed to them in the survey, putting their WTP between a range bounded by zero and 
the price increase bid. The third approves of the proposed specific tariff increase, implying 
a WTP above the bid. Following Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen (1991), an interval 
regression model can capture the joint probability of the sample households revealing 
themselves into respective categories, and thus estimate the mean or median WTP for 
upstream pollution control delivered by a PES system, as well as the impacts of individual 
and household characteristics on the WTP. 
Assume yi
*  is the latent WTP of individual i  for water quality improvement, which we do 
not observe directly. What we observe is the WTP interval that yi
*  falls into. The two-step 
WTP elicitation process can be formulated as follows: in the first step, individuals would 
reveal their WTPs between intervals ( , ]−∞ 0  and ( , )0 ∞ ; in the second step, those whose 
WTPs fell in ( , )0 ∞  were asked to further reveal their WTPs into interval ( , )0 α i  or 
[ , )α i ∞ , where α i  is the random bid of water tariff increase presented to individual i . 
Thus, yi
*  is narrowed down to one of the three mutually exclusive intervals, i.e., 
( , ]−∞ 0 , ( , )0 α i , [ , )α i ∞  denoted by 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Let dij , j =12 3, , , be indicator 
equal to 1 if yi
*  falls into interval j  and 0 otherwise. The probability of observing i ’s 
responses is
P Pr( ) Pr( ) Pr( )* * *i i
d
i i
d
i i
dy y yi i i= ≤ ⋅ < < ⋅ ≥0 01 2 3α α .
Modeling the latent WTP as a sum of deterministic and stochastic elements: 
y Xi i i
* *
= +β ε , where the deterministic element is a linear combination of household 
characteristics, Xi , and ε i
i i d F* . . * → . Then the probability becomes
P ( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( )]* * * *i i
d
i i i
d
i i
dF X F X F X F Xi i i= − ⋅ − − − ⋅ − −β α β β α β1 2 31 .
11 The negative WTP is possible here as the respondents may think that they deserve better quality of water for 
paying at the current water tariff; or, the water tariff should be lowered if the water quality cannot be improved. 
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The log-likelihood function for the joint distribution, which is to be maximized by MLE, is
ln ( ) ln ( ) ln[ ( ) ( )] ln[* * * *L d F X d F X F X d Fi i i i i i iβ β α β β= − + − − − + −1 2 3 1 ( )]α βi i
i
X−∑
IV. Data
Among the 775 valid households, those with respondents below age 17, missing 
important explanatory variables (e.g., income), or having inconsistent responses were 
dropped from the sample. The final sample consisted of 757 households. The dropped 
observations had little influence on the descriptive and regression results. 
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of respondent characteristics for the 
whole sample and approval or nonapproval of a water tariff increase. The average age of 
respondents was 47. Among the respondents, 40% were male, 39% had a high school 
diploma, and 20% a college or higher degree. An average household had 3.7 permanent 
residents living in an area of 94 square meters. Monthly water consumption was 16 cubic 
meters. Monthly disposable incomes was between CNY1,000 and 6,000 (about US$147–
882, respectively. When asked about perceived water quality, 11% of the respondents 
said piped water was not good, and 34% ranked the water quality of the Min River as not 
so good or bad. 
Regarding water tariff increases, 326 respondents, or 43% of the sample, said they would 
not approve. Among them, 123 said the government should be responsible for pollution 
mitigation; 22 attributed the responsibility of cleaning water to water companies; and 
31 attributed the responsibility to upstream polluters. High water tariffs or low income 
was another major reason for rejecting the proposal. Among respondents, 194 said that 
either the water tariff was already high or an additional water charge would be a burden. 
A considerable portion of respondents (44) were concerned with the effectiveness of 
the tariff increase on pollution mitigation. They doubted that the money would be used 
for reducing upstream pollution. Examining individual and household characteristics 
between households agreeing and disagreeing with a water tariff increase, we found that 
significant differences exist in age, gender, and education of the respondents, as well as 
in household income and living space. People who agreed with the idea of a water tariff 
increase were on average younger, more likely to be male, better educated, and come 
from wealthier families with a more spacious residence than those who disagreed. More 
respondents who would accept the water tariff increase had an impression of bad water 
quality for the Min River but not for piped water. While this comparison is informative, 
some characteristics such as household residence and income are highly correlated. We 
present the regression results below to see how each characteristic affects the attitude 
toward a water tariff increase when other characteristics are controlled for. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Overall Sample and Approval or Nonapproval  
of a Water Tariff Increase
Variables Definition Whole Sample No Increase Increase
Mean Std. 
Dev.
Mean Std. 
Dev.
Mean Std. 
Dev.
Age Age 46.89 16.59 48.86 16.00 45.39 16.89
Male Male 0.400 0.490 0.387 0.488 0.411 0.493
Lowedu Below high school education 0.410 0.492 0.482 0.500 0.355 0.479
Hsch High school and college associate 0.390 0.488 0.377 0.485 0.399 0.490
College College or higher degree 0.201 0.401 0.141 0.349 0.246 0.431
Hhsize Number of permanent residents 3.697 2.018 3.856 2.249 3.578 1.817
Livingsp Housing construction area (square 
meters)
93.90 47.07 91.98 48.58 95.35 45.90
Waterdmd Monthly water consumption (cubic 
meters)
15.88 12.28 15.74 11.66 15.99 12.74
income1 Monthly income below 1000 CNY 0.054 0.226 0.083 0.276 0.032 0.177
income2 Monthly income 1000-2000 CNY 0.221 0.415 0.252 0.435 0.197 0.398
income3 Monthly income 2000-4000 CNY 0.345 0.476 0.365 0.482 0.329 0.471
income4 Monthly income 4000-6000 CNY 0.196 0.397 0.160 0.367 0.223 0.417
income5 Monthly income 6000-8000 CNY 0.078 0.268 0.074 0.262 0.081 0.273
income6 Monthly income 8000-10000 CNY 0.059 0.237 0.037 0.189 0.077 0.266
income7 Monthly income above 10000 CNY 0.048 0.213 0.031 0.173 0.060 0.238
Waterbad Piped water is bad 0.106 0.308 0.104 0.306 0.107 0.309
Riverbad Min River water is bad or not so 
good
0.342 0.475 0.310 0.463 0.367 0.482
Obs Number of observations 757 326 431
Std. dev. = standard deviation. 
Source:  Authors’ estimation using Fuzhou household WTP survey data.
One objective of our analysis was to infer citywide residential WTP for upstream 
water source pollution control through PES. Therefore, it is critical to have a sample 
representative of the population of city residents. Table 2 compares several key variables 
of the sample with those in the Fuzhou Statistical Yearbook 2009 (Fuzhou Statistical 
Bureau 2009), the best source we found for information on the city population. Note, 
however, that the comparison is not ideal in that the Fuzhou Statistical Yearbook 2009 
provides statistics for 2008 for the whole city, including Mawei district, while our July 2009 
sample excluded Mawei. In addition, statistics computed for the sample could also differ 
in definition from those in the yearbook. 
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that the average sample household is nearly 20% bigger 
than that in the yearbook and has a 40% larger per capita housing area. The differences 
are statistically significant and unlikely to be explained by the time gap between the 
sample and the yearbook because family size in the city was quite stable in the past 
decade. The survey asked about apartment construction area, which is generally 
20–40% bigger than the actual living area in the PRC. The gap could be reconciled in 
cases where the yearbook reports living area. Nevertheless, a sampling error due to 
oversampling of large households might be the primary cause. Although households in 
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the sample appear to have more living space, income data do not suggest that they are 
wealthier than the population on average. To get a point estimate of mean household 
income, we assign the midpoint and the upper bound of the income bracket chosen by 
the respondent as household income. Sample mean income based on the midpoint is 
accurate if respondents report their incomes precisely and the income distribution is 
symmetric around the midpoint within each bracket. However, considering the multiple 
income sources of some households and the conservative tendency among Chinese 
about revealing their incomes, applying the upper-bound value of each bracket to 
calculate the sample mean may provide a more reliable estimate. The sample mean 
income based on midpoint is CNY14,839 per capita per year, which is CNY4,300 or 
20% less than the mean in the yearbook and which is statistically significant. The 
mean income gets very close and statistically indifferent to the yearbook average when 
calculated using the bracket’s upper-bound value. The difference diminishes to only 
CNY500, or 3% less than the average reported in the yearbook. Since household income 
rather than number of residents or housing area is the most important determinant of 
WTP and affects WTP positively, as shown in the following regressions, our estimates 
are likely to capture the WTP of the population. Finally, water consumption is strikingly 
consistent between the sample and population. An average sample household spends 
CNY10.25 per capita every month on piped water while the figure in the yearbook is 
CNY10.5. This result, together with the income data, raises a fair degree of confidence in 
the data set and the estimation results. 
Table 2: Representativeness of the Sample
Sample Mean Yearbooka t-test (p-value)b
Household size (person) 3.70 3.10 8.148 (<0.001)
Housing area (square meters/person) 28.72 20.50 13.68 (<0.001)
Annual income, using mid-point (CNY/person) 14,839 19,140 −9.118 (<0.001)
Annual income, using upper bound (CNY/person) 18,631 19,140 −0.971 (0.332)
Water bill (CNY/person/month) 10.25 10.50 −0.923 (0.356)
aFuzhou Statistical Yearbook 2009 (Fuzhou Statistical Bureau 2009). 
bThe null hypothesis is: sample mean = value in the Fuzhou Statistical Yearbook 2009.
To further pin down the WTP of those amenable to the water tariff increase proposal, 
a specific price increase was suggested to them. It was important to have the bids 
randomly distributed across respondents to obtain unbiased estimation of the models. We 
conducted an F-test to check the balance of bids distribution among various individual 
and household characteristics. As shown in the last row of Table 3, the numbers 
of respondents receiving different price increase bids are nearly equal. The F-tests 
demonstrate that the bids are well balanced for all the characteristics except for gender 
and perception of the Min River’s cleanliness, suggesting overall randomness of bids 
distribution.
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The internal validity of the contingent valuation survey requires that the proportion of 
respondents who accept the proposed price increase declines with the bid. The second 
to the last row in Table 3 presents a test of this condition. The proportions decrease 
monotonically from 96.5% with bid CNY0.1 to 82.1% with bid CNY0.3, and so on. When 
the proposed price increase doubles the base water supply fee and equals 60% of the 
prevalent total water tariff, only 36% of the respondents would approve the increase. 
Given that 43% of the entire sample objected to raising the water tariff, these results 
suggest that about 55% of the households would accept a CNY0.1 increase and 20% 
would accept a CNY1.2 increase. The F-test indicates that the decline is statistically 
significant and the survey passes the simple scope test. It is also interesting to note that 
the reasons for approving or disapproving the price increase are quite homogenous. Most 
people who favor the increase generally expect health and environmental benefits from 
water quality improvement. The main reason for rejecting the bid is that the proposed 
price increase is too large. Some respondents said they would accept a price increase in 
the range of CNY0.1 to CNY0.5. This outcome is encouraging in that it suggests that the 
respondents took budget constraints seriously in answering the survey questions.
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V. Results
This section reports estimation results related to WTP for upstream water source pollution 
control through PES. First, we examine what explains one’s position with respect to the 
water tariff increase proposal (response to the first WTP question). Second, we look 
at what roles the tariff increase bid as well as other characteristics play among those 
who favor the increase in accepting a specific amount of tariff increase (response to the 
second WTP question). The two questions are modeled with separate Logit models. With 
the sequential structure of WTP elicitation, however, people who answered both questions 
and those who answered “no” on the first question and therefore did not proceed to the 
second are not two independent subsamples. To estimate WTP for the entire sample, 
we need a model that integrates both groups and employs all the information available 
from the two WTP questions. In the third step, we use an interval regression model, as 
described in the previous section, to achieve this goal.  
A. Separate Logit Models
Column (1) of Table 4 represents a simple Logit model with the dependent variable being 
whether one approves of a water tariff increase in general. While the summary statistics 
show that significant differences in individual characteristics such as age, gender, 
education, and perception of the Min River quality exist between people holding opposite 
opinions, the differences are gone in the multivariate analysis. The most important factor 
that affects people’s position is household income. According to the regression estimates, 
the probability of approving the water tariff increase rises by 17 percentage points 
when one household’s income increases from the lowest bracket of CNY1,000 or below 
(the omitted group) to the bracket between CNY1,000 and CNY2,000.12 The approval 
probability for households in the top two income brackets (monthly income greater 
than CNY8,000) is 30 percentage points higher than that for households in the bottom 
bracket. It is also noted that the effects of higher income on the acceptance of water tariff 
increases is not smooth. The share of positive responses shoots up for households with 
income above CNY4,000 and for those with income above CNY8,000. Other household 
characteristics, except household size, are not important in the model. Household size 
has a small, negative impact on respondent’s choice, which probably reflects the income 
effect in per capita terms.
12 The predicted probability for households in the lowest bracket is 35%.
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Table 4: Models of WTP for Water Source Pollution Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
age −0.001 −0.009*** −0.009*** −0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
male 0.007 0.155*** 0.142*** 0.120
(0.039) (0.052) (0.053) (0.103)
hsch 0.019 0.043 0.044 0.062
(0.046) (0.0614) (0.065) (0.121)
college 0.089 −0.042 −0.036 0.176
(0.062) (0.086) (0.088) (0.165)
hhsize −0.026* −0.008 −0.005 −0.063
(0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.043)
livingsp −0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 −0.001
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.001)
waterdmd 0.001 −0.006** −0.006** −0.0001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
income2 0.172** 0.052 0.056 0.496**
(0.0799) (0.143) (0.144) (0.239)
income3 0.194** −0.023 −0.024 0.515**
(0.082) (0.160) (0.161) (0.238)
income4 0.263*** 0.106 0.107 0.825***
(0.076) (0.137) (0.140) (0.262)
income5 0.210** 0.189** 0.196** 0.776**
(0.086) (0.090) (0.093) (0.312)
income6 0.295*** 0.189** 0.202** 1.151***
(0.072) (0.087) (0.087) (0.337)
income7 0.291*** 0.089 0.084 1.015***
(0.072) (0.144) (0.153) (0.336)
waterbad −0.005 0.054 0.062 0.027
(0.059) (0.072) (0.073) (0.153)
riverbad 0.0514 −0.106* −0.119** 0.043
(0.040) (0.054) (0.057) (0.100)
Bid=CNY 0.3 −0.503***
(0.130)
Bid=CNY 0.6 −0.677***
(0.093)
Bid=CNY 0.9 −0.769***
(0.065)
Bid=CNY 1.2 −0.830***
(0.048)
Bid −1.386***
(0.279)
Bid square 0.515**
(0.201)
Observations 757 431 431 757
pseudo R2 0.037 0.325 0.318 -
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level.
** indicates significance at 5% level.
* indicates significance at 10% level.
Note: Marginal effects for the Logit models in (1)-(3). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
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Columns (2) and (3) present results from Logit models that take the subsample of 
respondents who approve of a water tariff increase and examine their responses to the 
specific bid of the tariff increase. In the first model (Column (2)), a set of dummies is used 
for the bids, with the lowest bid of CNY0.1 omitted. The second model includes quadratic 
terms of bids. Results indicate that WTP for water source pollution control declines with 
the additional payment required to cover the cost. Holding other variables constant at 
sample means, the probability of respondents approving a CNY0.3 increase in water 
tariff is 50 percentage points lower than that of a CNY0.1 increase, even though they 
all agree to pay something to control pollution. The decline is monotonic and slow with 
a higher bid (positive coefficient for the second-order term in column (3)). Both models 
confirm that the survey generates data that pass the test of internal validity conditional 
on other observables. However, these estimates should not be treated as those from a 
singlebounded CV sample because the subsample on which the estimates are obtained 
is screened by the first WTP question. An alternative model resolving the issue will 
be presented next. Variables such as age, gender, water consumption, income, and 
perception of river water quality also affect one’s response. For instance, households 
consuming more piped water are less likely to accept the same amount of tariff increase 
than households consuming less water, everything else remaining the same. Again the 
information should be taken with caution as they do not represent the impacts on the 
WTP for the whole sample.  
B. Interval Regression for WTP
Column (4) in Table 4 reports estimates of an interval regression model for the WTP of 
the survey sample. For individuals who opposed increasing the water tariff, the WTP is 
assumed to be less or equal to zero; for those rejecting the proposed tariff increase, the 
model assumes the WTP between zero and the bid; and for those favoring the increase 
the WTP should be equal or greater than the bid. Thus, the interval model is able to fully 
utilize the information available from the sequential WTP questions, and yield unbiased, 
efficient estimates for the entire sample. 
The pattern of column (4) is highly similar to that of column (1): income is the most 
important factor, in both economic and statistical terms, that determines one’s WTP 
for upstream pollution control. This result is consistent with the findings in Chongqing 
(Wang et al. 2008). On average, households with monthly incomes between CNY1,000 
and CNY4,000 are willing to pay CNY0.50 more per cubic meter of piped water than 
households earning less than CNY1,000. Households with incomes between CNY4,000 
and CNY8,000 and above are willing to pay CNY0.80 and CNY1.10 more, respectively, 
than the lowest income households. Moreover, the effects of income on the WTP appear 
to be discontinuous. About four income groups can be identified: those with monthly 
income below CNY1,000; between CNY1,000 and CNY4,000; between CNY4,000 and 
CNY8,000; and above CNY8,000. Households share similar valuations of water quality 
improvement within each group and have distinct valuations across groups. The strong 
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role household income plays in forming WTP presents at least two policy implications. 
First, a city’s aggregate WTP for upstream water source pollution control could be highly 
correlated with the city’s income level and perhaps income distribution, too. Second, 
a welfare-enhancing policy to increase residential water tariff must take into account 
households’ unequal income levels and better be accompanied by a reasonable subsidy 
or transfer plan. We elaborate on these two implications below.
Table 5 presents the predicted WTP mean for the whole sample as well as for different 
income groups. For an average household—all characteristics valued at sample 
means—the mean WTP for water source pollution control through PES is estimated to 
be CNY0.21, equivalent to a 10% increase from the current water tariff, or CNY2.05 per 
cubic meter. The 95% confidence interval for the mean WTP is (0.117, 0.306). The total 
annual WTP can be obtained for the whole city by extrapolating the estimated mean WTP 
of the population. Given a total of 543,133 households in the four districts of Fuzhou, 
whose drinking water comes from the Min River and whose water consumption per month 
per household is 15.88 cubic meter, the total annual WTP of the four districts amounts 
to CNY21.8 million.13 The confidence interval ranges from CNY12.1 million to CNY31.7 
million per year. 
Table 5: Predicted Mean WTP and Total WTP for the Population and by Income
Group Mean WTP 
(CNY)
95% Confidence 
Interval (CNY)
Sample 
Share
Monthly Water 
Consumption 
per Household 
(cubic meters)
Total Annual Water 
Consumption 
(million cubic 
meters)a
Total 
Annual 
WTP (CNY 
mil.)
All 0.211 (0.117, 0.306) 1.000 15.88 103.49 21.84
income1 −0.45 (−0.879, -0.021) 0.054 10.24 3.60 −1.62
income2 0.007 (−0.194, 0.208) 0.221 15.38 22.15 0.16
income3 0.083 (−0.069, 0.236) 0.345 14.45 32.50 2.70
income4 0.449 (0.238, 0.661) 0.196 17.74 22.67 10.18
income5 0.411 (0.041, 0.782) 0.078 18.02 9.16 3.76
income6 0.856 (0.417, 1.296) 0.059 21.04 8.09 6.93
income7 0.731 (0.288, 1.174) 0.048 17.33 5.42 3.96
a Annual total water consumption is the product of monthly water consumption per household; total number of households 
(543,133); sample share; and number of months per year. 
Note:  The predictions are based on the model estimated in column (4) of Table 4. Individual and household characteristics other 
than income are valued at sample means or subsample means for each income group. 
Table 5 shows that the mean WTP varies considerably with income level.14 For the lowest 
income group, the predicted mean WTP is negative and statistically different from zero. 
13 As a life essential, the own price elasticity of drinking water is small. Zhang et al. (2007) estimate the price elasticity 
of residential water demand across different income groups in Beijing and find that it falls between –0.6 to –0.8, 
except for households in the top 20%. Applying these figures, our calculation assuming zero price elasticity 
overstates the total WTPs by 6–8%. Also note that column (4) in Table 4 shows that respondents did not give much 
weight on actual water consumption in answering the WTP questions.
14 The mean WTP for each income group is calculated with other characteristics valued at the means of the group 
subsample. 
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The mean WTPs for income groups between CNY1,000 and CNY4,000 are CNY0.01 
and 0.08, respectively. They are smaller than the mean WTP of the sample and are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero. Noticeably, households within this income range 
account for more than 50% of the population. WTPs increase substantially for those with 
monthly income exceeding CNY4,000. For households earning CNY4,000–8,000, the 
mean WTP is equal to about CNY0.45. For incomes greater than CNY8,000, the mean 
WTP jumps to around CNY0.80. 
In light of the great influence income has on WTP for water pollution control, we 
conduct two simple numerical experiments to explore how the mean WTP is associated 
with income level and distribution. Because we only know which income bracket each 
household belongs to, it is difficult for us to shift the actual income of each household 
or to change the income distribution while holding average income level constant per 
se. In the first exercise, we look at a scenario where each household moves up the 
income bracket above its current bracket except for the top bracket. As a result, 5.4% 
of households now earn CNY1,000–Y2,000 per month; 22.1% of households earn 
CNY2,000–4,000, and so on. This approximates a 43% increase (CNY26,723 vs. 
CNY18,631) in annual average per capita income when the upper bound of each bracket 
is assigned to the households in the bracket. Holding other characteristics fixed, the 
simulation suggests that the predicted mean WTP would increase to CNY0.36 with the 
confidence interval of (0.23, 0.49). The mean WTP increases by CNY0.15 or 70% as 
compared to the WTP for the current income, which implies an income elasticity of WTP 
greater than one. The total WTP should go up more because water consumption has a 
positive income elasticity.
The second exercise is concerned with the effect of income distribution on the mean 
WTP. First, if the lowest income bracket households were all to move up to the next 
income bracket, i.e., CNY1,000–2,000, the mean WTP would increase to CNY0.24. 
Note, however, that the income gap is reduced due to poverty reduction (income level 
change) in this case. Second, we consider a scenario where income inequality is 
enlarged. Suppose that 5% of households in bracket CNY4,000–6,000 were moved 
down to the brackets below CNY1,000 (2.5%) and between CNY1,000–2,000 (2.5%). 
Another 5% of households from the bracket CNY4,000–6,000 were moved up to the 
bracket CNY8,000–10,000. By symmetry, the average income level is roughly unchanged. 
Our model suggests that the mean WTP would change little in this scenario, which is 
more or less expected since the high-income households’ higher WTP would offset low-
income households’ lower WTP. The simulation, though illustrative rather than conclusive, 
suggests that a city’s mean WTP for water pollution control is affected more by income 
level than by income distribution. 
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C. Cost–Benefit Analysis for the Fuzhou PES Program15
It is estimated that the total investment needed for Nanping livestock farms pollution 
control is CNY410–464 million for fixed costs and CNY27 million for annual operations 
and maintenance costs (ADB 2009). This includes installing and operating waste 
treatment facilities for 544 large and medium livestock farms and setting up household-
based biogas systems involving 480,000 small farms. Cost information for Sanming 
City is missing and we assume the same amount of fixed costs and operations and 
maintenance costs. The net present value of the costs of the Min River upstream pollution 
control, with 6% discount rate and project lifecycle of 25 years, is around CNY1.5 billion. 
Suppose that the 2009 PES financing frame is maintained for the provincial government 
and upstream governments, which pay a total of CNY70 million to the program every 
year. Nevertheless, Fuzhou City pays CNY22 million, which is equal to the total WTP 
financed by additional water utility revenue, instead of the current CNY30 million from the 
city’s budget. Further assume that the total WTP grows 8% annually, which is reasonable 
and conservative given the prospective income growth leading to higher average WTP 
and water consumption growth. The PES scheme will be economically viable with net 
present value ranging from CNY35 million to CNY137 million.16
D. Affordability and Distributional Issues
Affordability of water bills, especially to low-income residents, is an issue policymakers 
have to take into account in water tariff reform. We measure affordability with percentage 
share of income spent on domestic water. Because the actual income figures are missing, 
we imputed with the middle-point income as the income level for households in each 
bracket. The second column of Table 6 shows the results of dividing average household 
monthly water bills by the imputed incomes. Water expenditure is almost negligible for 
households earning CNY4,000 or more and accounts for 1–2% of income for those 
within the CNY1,000–4,000 income bracket. However, for the poorest households, 4.5% 
of income needs to be spent on water. With a flat-rate increase in water tariff, the poor 
would be affected more in terms of affordability. The income share for water would reach 
5% for the poorest if water tariff were raised by CNY0.21 (third column), while the shares 
remain below 1% for those earning more than CNY4,000 per month. 
In view of the fact that the lowest three income groups accounting for 60% of the 
population have mean WTP less than the sample average, any reform to increase the 
15 The following calculation is illustrative as a number of assumptions and simplification are adopted. Not taken into 
calculation are the potential development benefits foregone by the upstream cities, investment already made in 
pollution management, and actual benefits other than safe drinking water for Fuzhou. These factors and choice of 
parameters will affect the results in both ways.
16 The PES will be sustainable even if the overall scale of the program downsizes by 15% to CNY 85 million per year, 
which means that the payments made by the provincial government and upstream government could downsize 
by 10% or CNY7 million in addition to CNY8 million reduction in Fuzhou’s contribution.
Higher Water Tariffs for Less River Pollution—Evidence from Min River and Fuzhou City, People’s Republic of China | 21
water tariff by the average WTP needs to be combined with some public transfer in order 
that people are not made worse off. A water bill subsidy based on household income 
equal to the difference between the price increase and mean WTP (zero if mean WTP 
is negative) could achieve this goal. That means a subsidy of CNY0.21, CNY0.20, 
and CNY0.13 per cubic meter of water consumption for incomes below CNY1,000; 
CNY1,000–2,000; and CNY2,000–4,000, respectively. The last column of Table 6 shows 
the amount of subsidy needed for each of the three groups every year, which are 
CNY0.76, CNY4.52, and CNY4.16 million, respectively. A total amount of about CNY10 
million is sufficient to ensure that lower-income households are not made worse off by the 
water tariff increase of CNY0.21 per cubic meter. The negative figures for other income 
groups represent the consumer surplus left from the reform. The government may exploit 
this part of benefits to make the reform self-financing. A simple computation indicates that 
when the water tariff is raised by CNY0.27, the government could have sufficient revenue 
to compensate for the welfare loss of the lower income households in addition to the total 
WTP calculated at the mean WTP. 
Table 6: Affordability of Water Tariff Increase by Income Groups  
and Public Transfer Needed
Group Imputed 
Monthly 
Income 
(CNY)a
Average Share of 
Income for Water 
Expenses under 
Current Tariff (%)
Average Share of 
Income (CNY 0.21) for 
Water Expenses with 
Tariff Increase (%)
Difference 
between Tariff 
Increase  
(CNY 0.21) 
and WTP (CNY)b
Public 
Transfer 
(million CNY)
income1 500 4.5 5.0 0.211 0.761
income2 1500 2.3 2.5 0.204 4.519
income3 3000 1.1 1.2 0.128 4.160
income4 5000 0.8 0.9 −0.238 −5.394
income5 7000 0.6 0.7 −0.200 −1.832
income6 9000 0.5 0.6 −0.645 −5.219
income7 15000 0.2 0.2 −0.520 −2.820
aThe middle-point income of each bracket is used as the imputed income value.
bFor income1 group (below CNY 1,000), the difference is calculated as 0.211 and zero. 
VI. Conclusion
Through a contingent valuation survey involving more than 770 households in four 
districts of Fuzhou City, we estimate the mean WTP of Fuzhou residents for water 
pollution control administered by upstream cities to prevent the water quality of the 
Min River from falling below class III. The survey elicited WTP with two sequential 
dichotomous questions. The first asked respondents about their willingness to have a 
water tariff increase, and the second asked those who would accept a general water 
tariff to respond to a specified tariff increase proposal. Data show that 43% of the sample 
would not approve of a water tariff increase, with economic burden the primary reason, 
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while a significant proportion were concerned about government or the water utility’s 
responsibility in providing clean water as well as the effectiveness of public revenue 
utilization. Regression results indicate that household income is the most important factor 
in determining a respondent’s position on a water tariff increase. Households with monthly 
income of CNY1,000–8,000 (accounting for 85% of the population) are 17–26% more 
likely to approve of a water tariff increase than households earning CNY1,000 or less. 
Both summary statistics and a Logit model on respondents answering the second WTP 
question demonstrate that the survey is internally valid in that the probability of approving 
the specific price increase bid declines with the bid value.
We use an interval regression model to estimate WTP for upstream pollution control. 
Again, income plays a key role in determining a household’s WTP. Households with 
monthly income below CNY1,000 have negative mean WTP, while households earning 
CNY1,000–4,000 (60% of the population) are willing to pay around CNY0.50 more than 
households with income below CNY1,000. The mean WTP for the whole sample is 
estimated to be CNY0.21, higher than the mean WTP of households earning less than 
CNY4,000, and lower than that of households earning more than CNY4,000. Simple 
simulations show that the mean WTP is mainly influenced by income levels with an 
income elasticity greater than 1. Based on the mean WTP estimate, the total annual WTP 
of Fuzhou City for upstream pollution control is approximately CNY22 million. Maintaining 
investments from provincial government and other sources and assuming a 25-year 
project lifecycle with 6% discount rate, an annual payment equal to the total WTP—CNY8 
million less than Fuzhou City’s current contribution—is sufficient to sustain the ongoing 
PES. The finding suggests that the scale of the Min River basin PES can be reexamined 
with investment needs for upstream pollution control verified. Changing the funding 
source to water utility revenues from the government budget could improve the program’s 
economic efficiency. 
While water tariff reform with continuous water tariff increases is seen as essential for 
the PRC, our analysis points to the importance of considering the impacts of a tariff 
increase on different income groups in the reform. In Fuzhou’s case, water expenditure is 
a burden for the lowest income groups, and the mean WTP of households earning less 
than CNY4,000 per month is below the average WTP of the whole population. A 10% 
water tariff increase based on the population’s WTP will push the bottom households’ 
burden up by about half a percentage point, and result in welfare loss for more than 
60% of households.17 A water bill rebate given to eligible households based on their 
incomes is desirable so as not to make the water tariff increase hurt low-income families. 
An alternative approach, more commonly seen in reality, is a combination of moderate 
increase in base water tariff, enlarged tariff differences in block pricing, and lump-
17 Some argue that low water pricing and associated poor water quality impact the poor disproportionately (e.g., 
World Bank 2009). First, higher-income households consume more water and therefore benefit more from the 
subsidies on water. Second, in the presence of poor water quality, expensive substitutes such as bottled water 
leave poor households no choice but to consume water of inferior quality. 
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sum subsidies for the poorest households (such as those with monthly income below 
CNY1,000).
Although PES is increasingly practised as an effective mechanism in dealing with the 
externality of environmental and ecosystem services, a few issues related to PES are 
still open for research and policy discussion. PES will be efficient when the transaction 
cost is relatively low compared to the service benefits. Many institutional factors, not just 
the numbers of service buyers and providers, affect transaction cost. Thus, the design 
of a PES scheme has to be tailored to local systems, including the capacity to minimize 
transaction costs. Moreover, even if the PES is voluntary and user-financed, governments 
will still play a critical role in designing the program, monitoring service delivery, and 
enforcing the contract.  
Our estimates of mean WTP could be used as a reference point for other PRC cities with 
similar size and income level. One caveat, however, is that the PES scheme is clearly 
specified in the survey. Payment for upstream farmers reducing their pollution should be 
the rationale underlying the responses to the WTP questions. Therefore, our results may 
be more applicable to some cities than others that motivate water tariff reform differently 
(Bulte et al. 2005). It is of interest to see how responses vary with different rationales for 
a water tariff increase.
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About the Paper
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